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Faith-Based Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause
Martha A. Bodent
I. INTRODUCTION
Within a week of his 2001 inauguration, President George W. Bush
launched an aggressive campaign to expand governmental funding for
private religious groups to provide social services to the poor.' Although
it is widely believed that the President's Faith-Based Initiatives died on
the Senate floor, in fact, the Initiatives are a multi-billion dollar enter-
prise today.2 Like presidents before him, President Bush circumvented
Congress by invoking executive authority to override Congressional in-
action; unlike his predecessors however, President Bush pushed his plan
into action all the way down to the local level on a national scale. 3 In a
series of executive orders, President Bush shifted power from the legisla-
ture to the executive branch.4 Through these orders the Bush Administra-
f J.D., magna cure laude, Seattle Univ. School of Law, 2006; M.A., Anthropology, Univ. of New
Mexico, 1990; B.A., Anthropology, Haverford College, 1986. The author wishes sincerely to thank
Lisa Leone for convincing her that she could be a lawyer, Jeff Robinson and Amanda Lee for con-
vincing her to accept a position on SEATTLE U. L. REV., and Elisa Scalise and Deena Ledger for
patiently ushering this Comment to press. In addition, the author wishes to express deep gratitude to
Dr. Richard E. Boden for inspiring her dedication to civil liberties, and to Richard and Mary-Ann
Boden for giving generously to the author's education fund. This Comment is dedicated to the au-
thor's children, Isabel and Owen, who lovingly light her way; and to her husband, Ken Juell, who
provides irreplaceable emotional support, unfaltering patience, and who graciously has accepted a
lifetime of loan debt so that his wife could follow her dream.
1. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, EXECUTIVE
ORDERS, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemment/fbci/executive-orders.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter ORDERS].
2. See WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, GRANTS TO FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS, FY 2005, at 3 (2005) ($2.15 billion dollars reported for FY 2004 from a survey of
five federal agencies' non-formula grant funding) [hereinafter SELECT GRANTS FY05].
3. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION: CONSERVATIVE
POWER IN AMERICA, 132-33 (2004).
4. Anne Farris, Richard P. Nathan, & David J. Wright, The Expanding Administrative Presi-
dency: George W. Bush and the Faith-Based Initiative, The Roundtable on Religion and Social
Welfare Policy, Aug. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/policy/
FBAdministrativePresidencyReport 10 08_04.pdf.
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tion has built a new layer of federal bureaucracy dedicated to enabling
religious groups to compete for federal grant dollars without compromis-
ing their religious character.5 The resulting agency rules have opened the
floodgates for an unprecedented amount of government spending on reli-
gious social service programs.6
The newly intensified church-state partnership that has emerged
raises a serious constitutional question. In crafting the amended rules, the
Bush Administration has relied on an untested interpretation of First
Amendment jurisprudence: the assumption that religious institutions can
provide social and health services with direct governmental funding as
long as the funded activities are not inherently religious.7 This interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause is not supported by Supreme Court
precedent. 8 Moreover, its implementation through the Initiatives threat-
ens to weaken the protective wall between church and state that most
Americans believe does and should exist.9
The Administration's Faith-Based Initiatives would fail a constitu-
tional challenge under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Applying the three-pronged test developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman ° and
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,"1 this Comment concludes that the Initia-
tives, (1) though purportedly secular, have been enacted for a sectarian
purpose and are not neutral toward religion; (2) are coercive and fail to
fulfill the condition of private choice because the rural poor, such as
those in Franklin County, Washington, whom the Initiatives target, real-
5. Id.
6. See SELECT GRANTS FY05, supra note 2 ("Grants to faith-based organizations increase by
22% from FY04 to FY05, funding increased by 7%." Total funding for FY05 was estimated at
$2.15 billion, up $1 billion from FY03). See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND
COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, GRANTS TO FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS, FY 2003, at 5 (2003) [herein-
after FY03]. Note that these figures do not reflect all federal funding of faith-based organizations,
just funds from five agencies that award competitive grants to social service providers. Id.
7. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002); WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, GUIDANCE TO FAITH-BASED AND
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ON PARTNERING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2001) [hereinaf-
ter GUIDANCE]; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Developments in the Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives: Comments on Notices of Proposed Rulemaking and Guidance Document,
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, Jan. 2003, available at
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/reports/1-9-2003_exec orderanalysis.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 7-10; infra Part IV.
9. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, PUBLIC
DIVIDED ON ORIGINS OF LIFE (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://pewforum.org/docs/
index.php?DoclD=l 15# 4. The Pew Forum conducted a survey in July 2005, which showed that
sixty-three percent of Americans polled believe that clergy should never discuss political candidates
from the pulpit. Id.
10. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
11. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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istically cannot choose between non-religious and sectarian service pro-
viders; and (3) to the extent that Initiative funded programs can be kept
separate from sectarian influence, they constitute impermissibly exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion. Therefore, federal
taxpayers, whose tax dollars fund Faith-Based Initiative programs such
as the Compassion Capital Fund for Lourdes Hospital, a Catholic run
facility in eastern Washington, have a cause of action under the First
Amendment and should succeed in challenging the Initiatives under the
Establishment Clause test.
Additionally, this Comment identifies serious problems with the
Initiative program in light of public policy interests. That this compli-
cated and expansive funding program provides inadequate guidance to
religious service providers, lacks transparency in its operations, and con-
tains no obvious oversight provisions, not only undermines the Admini-
stration's purported purposes, but also indicates that the program is ripe
for abuse.' 2 As it crosses the limit of permissible government entangle-
ment with religion, the Bush Administration acknowledges that it is toy-
ing with a "delicate" constitutional balance of interests.13 Yet, it has not
demonstrated the capacity to safeguard this balance. Today, as poor
Americans become poorer' 4 and the national debt continues to rise,' 5 we
must invoke the Constitution to prevent the Executive branch from op-
pressing the rural poor, America's most vulnerable demographic sector,
with state-sponsored religious coercion that negatively impacts recipi-
ents' health and wellbeing. To allow such religious oppression undercuts
the intent of the framers of the First Amendment.
Part II of this Comment describes one rural Washington community
that is indicative of the population that the Initiatives purport to target:
the poor and underserved. The policy and structure of the Initiatives are
outlined in Part III, including funding streams that reach these rural
Washington State residents through Catholic run healthcare programs in
Franklin County. In Part IV this Comment briefly surveys the history of
Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence and identifies the test
applicable to this set of facts. Part V scrutinizes these Initiative programs
12. See infra Part V.B.
13. See e.g., Statement of Jim Towey, Ask the White House (2003), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/ask/20030912.html; see also Mike Allen, Bush Presses 'Faith-Based Agenda': President Pro-
poses Regulation to Ease Federal Funding, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at A10, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A49355-2003Sep22?language=printer.
14. See Denavas-Walt, Carmen, Bernadette D. Proctor & Robert J. Mills, U.S. Census Bureau,
Current Population Reports, 60-226, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in The
United States: 2003, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2004.
15. The federal deficit stands at $8.35 trillion as of May 22, 2006. See UNITED STATES
TREASURY DEP'T, THE DEBT TO THE PENNY (MAY 22, 2006), available at http://
www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/podpenny/htm.
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under the combined Lemon and Zelman test, and Part VI concludes that
the Initiatives entail a government establishment of religion and, there-
fore violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
II. THE UNDERSERVED: A PROFILE OF THE
RURAL POOR IN ONE WASHINGTON COUNTY
Our country is blessed with a long tradition of and honorable com-
mitment to assisting individuals, families, and communities who
have not fully shared in America's prosperity. But despite efforts by
the federal and state governments to battle social distress, too many
of our neighbors still suffer from poverty and despair. In every cor-
ner of America, people of all ages and walks of life are calling out
for help.' 6
With this observation, the Administration has signaled its intention
to assist the desperately poor and needy, many of whom live in rural ar-
eas like Franklin County, Washington. While eighty percent of Ameri-
cans live in the one-quarter of United States counties that are classified
as "metropolitan,"' 7 sixty million others live in rural areas and share
socio-economic characteristics that greatly impact their health and well-
being. As the Administration has noted, reaching the needy "in every
corner of America" presents special challenges for service providers. 8
Compared to their metropolitan counterparts, rural Americans tend
to be poorer.' 9 Two potent forces, lack of access to jobs and lack of ac-
cess to services, conspire in combination against the wellbeing of rural
community residents.20 The relationship between poverty and poor
health is well-documented, and this impact is accentuated in out-lying
communities where there are few doctors or hospitals within reach. 2' For
instance, hospitals in rural communities experience lower reimbursement
rates than those operating in cities and tend to narrow their service offer-
ings or to cease operating in response to such financial squeezing.22 Ad-
ditionally, rural physicians are more likely to provide care outside their
16. White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, President Bush's Faith-
Based and Community Initiative, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ govemment/fbei/four-
page-overview205.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (on file with author).
17. Linda S. Loew, Location, Location, Location: Rural Areas and Health, in POVERTY LAW
MANUAL FOR THE NEW LAWYER, at 74 (2002).
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. MARK S. EBERHARDT ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HHS HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2001: URBAN AND RURAL HEALTH CHARTBOOK 208-09 (2001); see also Lisa C.
Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1996).
21. EBERHARDT ET AL., supra note 20, at 75.
22. Id.
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specialty areas, a practice that may compromise the quality of patient
care, especially since rural doctors are less likely to have access to inter-
net or library research services. 23
Consequently, rural Americans enjoy markedly poorer physical and
mental health than their metropolitan counterparts. 4 Rural Americans are
more obese, more likely to smoke, and less likely to carry health insur-
ance than Americans as a whole.25 Rural children and young adults are
more likely to die from disease or suicide than if they lived in or near a
city. 26 The chance of dying in car accidents is greater for those who live
in sparsely populated communities as well, 27 possibly as a result of
greater distance from emergency services.
Recognizing this unmet need for social and health services, state
legislators often direct state or federal funds to service providers willing
to operate in remote areas.28 In Washington, for example, rural healthcare
centers receive the highest proportion of Medicare and Medicaid funding
allocated statewide. 29 In 2002, Washington state and federal funding for
rural medical care totaled an impressive one billion dollars. 30 Even so,
twenty-four percent of residents in Franklin County, the poorest county
in Washington, currently lack health insurance. 31 Experts agree that the
number of uninsured is rising faster than resources are made available to
meet expanding need.32 Thus, the healthcare gap is widening in Wash-
ington.
Despite these governmental subsidy programs, Washington's
Franklin County residents cope with a significant shortage of medical
services. 33 Franklin County is served by only one hospital: Lourdes
Medical Center located in Pasco. 34 Two private, non-profit outpatient
clinics comprise the primary care option for most of Franklin County's
23. Id.
24. Id; see also DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, POVERTY AND HEALTH
CHARTBOOK 209, tbl. 57 (2002) (on file with author).
25. Loew, supra note 17, at 74.
26. Id
27. Id.
28. LAWRENCE HETTICK & RICHARD ORDOS, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,




31. See John Trumbo, La Clinica Fills Vital Need in Community, But It's Struggling, TRI-CITY
HERALD, Sept. 20, 2004 [hereinafter Trumbo I].
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Trumbo I, supra note 31; Press Release, Senator Patty Murray, Murray An-
nounces 1.2 Million for Rural Healthcare: Funding Will Provide Healthcare to Underserved and At-
risk Rural Communities (July 6, 2001), available at http://murray.senate.gov/news.cfm?id=189471.
34, See Trumbo I, supra at note 31.
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poor.35  La Clinica, the largest and only full-time clinic, handles the
lion's share of charity outpatient care and reportedly writes off one quar-
ter of its budget as uncompensated care or bad debt each year.36 Lourdes,
a Catholic hospital founded by the Sisters of St. Joseph, is the only op-
tion for inpatient and emergent care in Franklin County.3 More expen-
sive than La Clinica, Lourdes currently faces losing half of its licensed
38 39beds due to non-use. In contrast, at La Clinica business is booming. In
particular, La Clinica recently has experienced an influx of new, unin-
sured patients who cannot afford to visit Lourdes and who have been
turned away by other doctors.40
Franklin County's healthcare situation is emblematic of rural com-
munities nationwide, many of which are served by scattered handfuls of
religious and secular non-profit caregivers like Lourdes and La Clinica.41
Attempting to capitalize on the longstanding presence of providers who
are already operating in needy communities, in 2001 President George
W. Bush founded the White House Office of Faith-Based and Commu-
nity Initiatives. 42 The program is designed to build on the private system
already in place by infusing existing providers with additional resources
so that their services can reach more people.43
III. THE BUSH SOLUTION: FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES
A. The Bush Faith-Based Plan
Faith-based and other community organizations are indispensable in
meeting the needs of poor Americans and distressed neighborhoods.
Government cannot be replaced by such organizations, but it can
and should welcome them as partners. The paramount goal is com-
passionate results, and private and charitable community groups, in-
cluding religious ones, should have the fullest opportunity permitted
by law to compete on a level playing field, so long as they achieve
valid public purposes .... This delivery of social services must be
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. John Trumbo, Medical Center Expects to Lose 75 Beds, TRI-CITY HERALD, June 15, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 12381207 [hereinafter Trumbo 11].
38. Id.
39. See Trumbo I, supra note 31.
40. Id.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 14-24.
42. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002).
43. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
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results oriented and should value the bedrock principles of plural-
ism, nondiscrimination, evenhandedness, and neutrality.44
With this proclamation George W. Bush unveiled his White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives just nine days after tak-
ing presidential office.45 To anyone knowledgeable about Bush's Texas
governorship, these actions came as no surprise.46 President Bush had
created a similar set of programs in Texas immediately upon passage of
the so-called 1996 Welfare Reform Act.
47
The Initiative orders were different from President Bush's earlier
Charitable Choice efforts in one important respect: at the federal level,
President Bush's Faith-Based Initiatives never received the same man-
date that they had enjoyed at the Texas state level. The Initiative Orders
were crafted as a work-around after efforts to establish the Initiatives
through Congressional legislation stalled on Capital Hill. Disenchanted
with Congressional debates centering on process concerns, President
Bush decided, instead, to instigate his Initiatives unilaterally. 48 He said,
"I got a little frustrated in Washington 'cause I couldn't get the bill
passed .... [Congress was] arguing process ... so I signed an executive
order-that means I did it on my own. It says we're going to open up
billions of dollars in grant money competition to faith-based charities.
And that's what's happening .. .. ,9 In his own words, President Bush
valued church-state partnership so highly that he was willing to imple-
ment it unilaterally despite legislators' desire to ensure the soundness and
efficacy of the programs.
By the end of his first term, President Bush had issued four more
Faith-Based Initiatives via Executive Order.50 Together, this series estab-
lished offices run by carefully selected directors and staff empowered to
implement the President's faith-based policy across ten executive agen-
44. Id.
45. Id.; Farris et at., supra note 4, at 4.
46. See Scott S. Greenberger, Putting Faith in Their Futures-With Nod from Bush, State and
Religion Join Forces for Jobs, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 26, 1999, at A I (remarking about
then governor Bush's encouragement of Texas social service agencies to contract with religious
organizations).
47. Farris et al., supra note 4, at 4.
48. Id. at 4-5 (quoting George W. Bush's speech in Los Angeles, CA, Mar. 3, 2004).
49. Id.
50. Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 29, 2001); Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67
Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 12, 2002); Exec. Order No. 13,280, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,145 (Dec. 12, 2002);
Exec. Order No. 13,342, 69 Fed. Reg. (2004). For complete texts, see WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF
FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
govemment/fbci/executive-orders.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
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cies.51 These agency offices, in turn, connected centrally to the high-
profile White House Office directed by Jim Towey, the new Assistant to
the President.52
The Administration also solicited state and local governments to
advance the Initiative program. 53 To date, thirty-two states have created
Initiative departments or liaisons at the Administration's urging.54 These
offices encourage participation in the program, educate and train contrac-
tors in the grant process, and facilitate distribution of federal block grants
and formula grants to subcontractors within states.55
Through one additional order, Number 13,279, announced in De-
cember of 2002, President Bush established guidelines to ensure what the
Administration termed "equal protection" for religious organizations
56seeking partnership with the U.S. government. Among these guidelines,
designed to end what President Bush perceived to be historic "discrimi-
nation" against religious groups, were (1) to "level the playing field" so
religious organizations could compete on equal footing for grant money;
(2) to foster non-discrimination by prohibiting "inherently religious ac-
tivity" with federal dollars; (3) to protect "maintenance of religious char-
acter" for grant recipients; and (4) to "prevent discrimination against re-
cipients based on religious belief., 57 This Executive Order also rolled
back a 1965 Lyndon Johnson order preventing federal funding to provid-
ers with discriminatory hiring practices.58 In sum, President Bush in-
tended to eliminate two major obstacles that had prevented religious
grant-seekers from seeking federal aid: their religious character and their
practice of hiring only those within their religious sect.59
51. Id; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 4; Farris et al., supra note 4, at 2. Included are the
departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Justice, Labor, Veterans' Affairs, Aid for International Development, and Small Busi-
ness Administration.
52. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Personnel Announcement
(Jan, 13, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050113-8.html;
see Farris et al., supra note 4, at 2.
53. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, FEDERAL
FUNDS FOR ORGANIZATIONS THAT HELP THOSE IN NEED (2004) [hereinafter FUNDS].
54. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, IMPORTANT
CONTACT INFORMATION-STATE LIAISONS (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
govemment/fbci/contact-states.html.
55. Exec. Order No.13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002).
56. Id.; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 4.
57. Exec. Order No.13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002); Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 7, at 4.
58. Farris et al., supra note 4, at 15.
59. Exec. Order No.13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002); Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 7, at 4-5.
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To implement this vision of an expanded partnership between reli-
gious organizations and government, the Bush Administration immedi-
ately ordered internal audits of agency rules, policies, and practices.6 °
Each agency was ordered to identify barriers preventing religious groups
from competing for federal money on an equal footing with secular char-
ity groups.6'
Based on these audits, the President identified what he considered
to be "unnecessary" practices that unfairly discriminated against and dis-
advantaged religious organizations. These practices were to be elimi-
nated by rule changes within each agency.62 The Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) complied with the President's ninety day
deadline and proposed amendments to rules in three welfare-related
healthcare programs. 63 Each of these proposed rules essentially parroted
the language of President Bush's Executive Orders.64 Under the notice
and comment process of the Administrative Procedure Act, these rules
slid into place within months without Congressional action or debate. 65
The Bush Administration simultaneously launched a national ad-
vertising campaign to gain public support for the Initiatives and to edu-
cate church groups about the new funding opportunities. President Bush
personally gave more than forty speeches dedicated to the Initiative pro-
gram during the first three years of his presidency.66 Meanwhile, a troupe
of presenters embarked on a national whistle-stop tour, meeting with
groups of religious leaders in fourteen cities to disseminate advice and to
encourage participation in competitive grant writing.67 The White House
distributed a lengthy catalogue of federal grants totaling fifty billion dol-
lars in funds available to religious and community groups.68 The Admini-
stration also published a guide book for religious groups seeking federal
grants and posted it on the White House internet webpage.69 The new
language instructed religious groups to comply with the following, am-
biguously worded directive:
Accordingly, a faith-based organization that applies for or partici-
pates in a social service program supported with Federal financial
assistance may retain its independence and may continue to carry
60. Farris et al., supra note 4, at 6.
61. Id.
62. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 5.
63. Namely, TANF, CSBG, and SAMHSA. See id.
64. Id. at 6-11
65. Farris et al., supra note 4, at 6.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id.
69. See GUIDANCE, supra note 7; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 4.
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out its mission, including the definition, development, practice,
and expression of its religious beliefs, provided that it does not use
direct Federal financial assistance to support any inherently reli-
gious activities, such as worship, religious instruction, or proselyti-
zation.7 °
President Bush's aggressive plan quickly infused faith-based and
community contractors with billions of dollars. 71 The Administration
reports that, in 2004 alone, it distributed $2.15 billion through five fed-
eral agencies (This figure omits funding through half of the agencies and
does not include formula and block grants, which are delivered via the
states and, therefore, not tracked by the Administration). 72 Grants to reli-
gious organizations increased within the Health Department almost fifty
percent between 2003 and 2004; overall, the Administration reports that
religious groups received eight percent of total Initiative funding within
these programs.73
B. The Initiatives Assume a Shaky Constitutional Premise
Presidential executive orders are only valid if they comply with
federal law,7 4 and the orders and ensuing regulatory amendments contain
many references to supportive constitutional and statutory guidelines. 5
Irrespective of assertions such as seeking to build a partnership "to the
extent permitted by law" and valuing "the bedrock principals of plural-
ism, nondiscrimination, evenhandedness, and neutrality," the President's
language is vague about what religious characteristics may be retained
legally and what activities would be unconstitutional. Only "inherently
religious activities such as religious worship, religious instruction, and
proselytization" are prohibited7 6
The Bush Administration legal department's interpretation of activ-
ity prohibited by the Establishment Clause, which they attribute in their
Guidance Document to language from the Supreme Court, does not nec-
essarily comport with accepted Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The phrase "inherently religious activity" only appears in one Supreme
Court majority decision, the 1988 case of Bowen v. Kendrick.78 The
Court reviewed Bowen as an Establishment Clause challenge to the Ado-
70. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002).
71. SELECT GRANTS FY05, supra note 2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 5.
75. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 FR 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
76. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 6 (quoting the "Guidance" Document).
77. Id. at 6-9.
78. Id. at 8 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 590 (1988)).
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lescent and Family Life Act, a program that granted federal funds to pri-
vate groups providing sex education for young people. 79 In its decision
the Court used the term "inherently religious" to demarcate activities that
were never legitimate objects of government funding, such as worship,
religious instruction, or proselytization. The Court found the education
and counseling programs in question not to be inherently religious. 8' On
this basis, the Court upheld their facial validity.82
The Bowen decision stands for the proposition that the First
Amendment never permits government support of inherently religious
activities but should not be interpreted to mean that the First Amendment
permits all other activities undertaken by religious social service provid-
ers.8 3 To evaluate the constitutionality of the Initiatives under the Estab-
lishment Clause, it is necessary to look at modem Supreme Court juris-
prudence as controlling precedent. The following section provides a brief
historic overview of the Establishment Clause, discusses the recent trend
in Supreme Court opinions, and presents the two landmark decisions-
Lemon and Zelman-in which the Court has developed its framework for
analyzing the constitutionality of government programs that interface
with religion.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
A. The Early Debates: The Thorny Problem with Establishment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.84
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment, drafted in 1789, were essentially a compromise among leaders
seeking to create the right to freedom from religious oppression. 85 Ironi-
cally, although many of the colonists had fled Europe to escape forcible
support of state-favored churches, the reality in eighteenth century Amer-
ica was that this oppressive practice had been rekindled and was gaining
momentum within some states.86 Whether the First Congress intended to
79. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 589.
80. Id. at 591, 605.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 623.
83. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 9.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
85. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-103 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
86. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1947); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25-62 (1986); Philip B. Kurland,
1001
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abolish state-sponsored churches, to prevent the federal government from
overpowering the state churches, or to offer the Establishment Clause as
a political token to appease disgruntled constituents is unclear.87 What
the Establishment Clause appears to represent is an imperfect Congres-
sional solution to a pressing political problem that created far-reaching
issues of its own.
Legal scholars generally agree that the First Congress intended the
Establishment Clause to prohibit forcible allegiance to government-
endorsed (Protestant) religious sects.88 There has never been consensus
about how to apply this cryptic but potent passage to challenge laws that
threaten to establish religion.89 The Clause's vague language has pro-
vided little guidance and has resulted in heated and enduring debate be-
tween those who believe it to stand for freedom from government prefer-
ence of one religion over others and those who maintain, instead that the
clause forbids government support of any religious activity or sect.90 The
words of Justice Black epitomize the latter, separationist view: that the
Establishment Clause represented America's "conviction that individual
religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all
religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or
group. '91 This reading of the Establishment Clause comports with the
position of Thomas Jefferson, who is widely, and perhaps misleadingly,
cited as its original interpreter fourteen years after its adoption.92 In his
famous 1802 letter to a group of Connecticut Baptists, Thomas Jefferson
declared that through the First Amendment the American people had
built an impermeable and protective "wall of separation between church
and state." 93
Despite the clarity and conviction of his words, however, Jeffer-
son's perspective has by no means been accepted universally as indica-
tive of the Framers' intent.94 Some argue that James Madison's original
The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1979).
87. See generally LEVY, supra note 85.
88. Id. at 75-89.
89. See generally id.
90. Id.
91. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
92. For commentary critical of Jefferson's role in shaping Establishment Clause interpretation
see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) and John C. Jeffries,
Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 292-
305 (2001).
93. THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America 1984).
94. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see generally LEVY, supra
note 85.
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proposal, which included the phrase "national religion," signaled his in-
tention only to prevent establishment of one federally sanctioned religion
at the expense of all others, and not to separate church and state categori-
cally. 95 Chief Justice Rehnquist, notable modem proponent of this non-
preferentialist position, recently has written that the Establishment
Clause does not require government neutrality between religion and irre-
ligion; nor, in his opinion, does it prohibit the Federal Government from
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.96 Clearly, the debate that the
First Congress initiated over two hundred years ago still resonates today.
The impact of this philosophical struggle has both shaped and been im-
pacted by Supreme Court jurisprudence throughout American history.97
B. The Modern Cases: Trending Away from Separationism
The 1947 landmark Everson decision is widely regarded as the be-
ginning of modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 98 In this case,
Everson, a New Jersey taxpayer brought suit against the Board of Educa-
tion of Ewing Township for reimbursing the parents of parochial school
students for city bus fare used to transport their children to Catholic
schools. 99 Everson's claim challenged the constitutionality of the New
Jersey statute that authorized this reimbursement for private, non-profit
school transportation in districts where similarly situated public school
students received free bus service.'0 0
In an opinion written by Justice Black and quoted above, the Su-
preme Court revitalized the Jeffersonian separationist language. 10 Ac-
cording to the Everson Court, not only does the First Amendment erect a
protective wall between church and state, but this wall "must be kept
high and impregnable ... not approv[ing] the slightest breach."',0 2 Justice
Black continued, "The [Establishment Clause] means at least this:
[n]either a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one relig-
ion over another.'10 3
95. LEVY, supra note 85, at 91-93.
96. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106.
97. See infra Part 1V.B-D.
98. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686-87 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Aaron Cain, Faith-Based Initiative Proponents Beware: The Key in Zelman is not Just Neutrality,
but Private Choice, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 979, 991 (2004). The case was Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
99. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
100. Id. The statute at issue was N.J. Rev. Stat § 18:14-8 (1941).
101. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 15.
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In tension with this language, the Everson decision also laid the
foundation for subsequent Court treatment of Establishment Clause cases
that culminated in the more recent "neutrality" doctrine. 10 4 The Everson
Court concluded that, although the state cannot contribute tax dollars to
support religious schools, neither can it constitutionally hamper its citi-
zens' free exercise of religion. 10 5 Because it decided that the New Jersey
law merely extended general state benefits to all children, irrespective of
religious affiliation, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the state law. 10 6 In passing, one member of the Court noted the statute's
laudable public purpose of transporting rural children to school. 107 In
sum, the Everson decision, replete with separationist language, actually
turned on the implicit presumption that government programs that treat
religious and secular participants the same do not amount to impermissi-
ble establishment of religion.
Legal scholars generally equate "equal treatment" with the concept
labeled "formal neutrality."'108 Formal neutrality eschews classifications
based on religion.109 An example of formal neutrality concept is the law
against peyote use, which prohibits peyote ingestion whether or not the
user is a Native American engaged in a spiritual ceremony.
Formal neutrality is distinguishable from "substantive" neutrality,
which refers to religious accommodation. 110 A substantively neutral law
would, for example, exempt passivist Quakers from the military draft. It
is critical to note that, when jurists write that a program is "neutral" it is
often unclear which definition is operating.111 Regarding the Faith-Based
Initiatives, this Comment argues, below, that the Bush Administration
appears to intend the program to achieve both formal and substantive
neutrality simultaneously.1 12
Though flawed and ambiguous, the notion of "neutrality" has be-
come standard in Supreme Court jurisprudence in the wake of Ever-
son,113 and represents the outcome of sixty years of gradual erosion of
separationist language since Everson was decided. 14 The intervening
104. Cain, supra note 97, at 997.
105. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
106. Id. at 16-17.
107. Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
108. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 696 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting); Douglas
Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
993,999-1000 (1990).
109. Laycock, supra note 109, at 999-1000.
110. Id. at 1000-01.
111. Id. at 994.
112. See infra Part V.
113. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
114. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 688 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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series of cases suggests that the Court has acknowledged how impractical
it has been to apply such a rigorous standard when, in reality there has
always been some interconnection between religion and government in
America. " 5 With this reality in mind, the Justices have struggled to adopt
a workable Establishment Clause paradigm, but most decisions have
been supported by a plurality of Justices or, at most, five members of the
Court.1 6 The Court has adopted a fact-intensive approach to the Estab-
lishment Clause controversies, while observing with humility that "we
can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily
sensitive area of constitutional law."'"l 7
Approximately thirty years after deciding Everson, the Supreme
Court attempted to clarify the constitutional boundaries of government
aid to religious institutions in another landmark case: Lemon v. Kurtz-
man." 8 Though not consistently followed and not universally accepted
by the Justices," 19 elements of the three-pronged Lemon test have per-
sisted since this opinion was written in 197 1.120 For this reason, it is ap-
propriate to analyze the Initiatives in light of the Lemon test, outlined in
the following discussion.
C. The Lemon Test: Emphasis on Excessive Entanglement
As in Everson, the controversy giving rise to Lemon v. Kurtzman
arose in the context of aid to parochial schools.' 2' The Court consolidated
appeals to Establishment Clause challenges to statutes enacted in Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania.' 22 The Rhode Island law supplemented paro-
chial school teacher salaries by up to fifteen percent to bring their com-
pensation to parity with secular school teachers. 23 The salary supple-
ments were earmarked specifically for secular subjects taught at private,
sectarian schools with lower per capita budgets for non-religious educa-
tion than their public counterparts.' 24 To participate in the program, paro-
chial schools were required to submit financial records to Department of
Education personnel, and the teachers were required to complete a con-
tract agreeing not to use the state portion of their salaries for religious
115. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952)); see also Cain, supra note 97, at 992.
116. Cain, supra note 97, at 991-1006.
117. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
118. See generally id.
119. See Cain, supra note 97, at 995 n.149, for an exhaustive list of subsequent Supreme Court
cases criticizing or neglecting elements of the Lemon test.
120. See id. at 995 n.148 (listing Supreme Court cases applying elements of the Lemon test).
121. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-11.
122. Id. at 602.
123. Id. at 607.
124. Id.
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instruction. 125 The Pennsylvania law at issue was similar to Rhode Is-
land's, except that Pennsylvania State funded sectarian schools rather
than paying teachers directly, and schools were also reimbursed for text-
books and supplies used in secular subjects. 126 Alton Lemon, plain-
tiff/appellant, was a Pennsylvania citizen, taxpayer, and parent of a child
attending a state-run public school.127
In rendering its decision, the Lemon Court borrowed heavily from
Everson as well as opinions it had written in the interim. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Berger observed, "we must draw lines with refer-
ence to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' '1 28 To fulfill this di-
rective, Chief Justice Berger identified what he termed "the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years": (1) secular legislative
purpose, (2) primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and (3) prohibition against excessive government entanglement with re-
ligion.121
Regarding both programs, the Court did not question that the goal
of providing adequate education in secular subjects was a valid secular
purpose. Chief Justice Berger seemed to agree with the Everson Court
that educating young students was a laudable objective.1 30 He stated,
"[W]e find nothing here that undermines the stated legislative intent; it
must therefore be accorded appropriate deference.1 31
Chief Justice Berger never reached the effects prong of his three-
part test, because he found both statutes unconstitutional based on the
third, so-called "entanglement" element.1 32 He found that the state aid
programs each resulted in excessive entanglement between the govern-
ment and the Catholic Church based on his examination of (1) the char-
acter and purposes of the parochial schools, (2) the nature of the aid pro-
vided, and (3) the resulting relationship between the government and the
church.
133
First, Chief Justice Berger found that the parochial schools could
not be meaningfully segregated from the parish churches that sponsored
125. Id. at 608.
126. Id. at 609 10.
127. Id. at 611.
128. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). One wonders
whether the Chief Justice appreciated the irony in his repeated reference throughout his opinion to
the avoidance of the "evil" of religious establishment.
129. Id. at 612-13.
130. Id. at 613.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 613-14.
133. Id. at 615.
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them. Schools were located close to affiliated churches, the majority of
teachers were nuns, and the class facilities were decorated with Catholic
iconography such as crucifixes, statues of biblical figures, and religious
paintings. 34 Instruction in faith and morals were part of the total educa-
tional mission. 35 Therefore, Chief Justice Berger concluded that the
schools were religious in character and purpose. 36
Second, the Court found it significant that the state aid flowed to
teachers. It distinguished governmental provision of textbooks from
funding instruction, because teaching involved greater potential for in-
serting aspects of faith or religious morality than did textbooks on secu-
lar subjects. 137 The Court observed that parochial teachers were bound by
the Handbook of School Regulations, which provided that "religious
formation is not ... restricted to a single subject area," and that teachers
should stimulate interest in religious vocations and charity.' 38 Berger
noted: "The conflict of functions inheres in the situation."' 139
Last, the Court was highly concerned with the resulting relationship
between the government and the church once these laws were imple-
mented. Though reassured by language in both statutes safeguarding
separation of religious and secular teaching, Chief Justice Berger con-
cluded that ongoing surveillance to ensure avoidance of conflicts would
entail "excessive and enduring entanglement between state and
church."' 140 Sectarian schools would be forced to provide the state with
periodic financial reports;' 4' and these reports would inevitably lead to
ever increasing government subsidies as the population grew and the
schools' financial crises deepened as expected. 142
Chief Justice Berger's holding foreshadows Court interest in the
element of "private choice" that became a central tenet of subsequent
Establishment Clause doctrine. 143 Finding that the Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania statutes violated the Establishment Clause, Chief Justice
Berger held, "The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement are inevita-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 616.
137. Id. at 617.
138. Id. at 618.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 619.
141. Id. at 620.
142. Id. at 623.
143. See e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000).
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ble, lines must be drawn."' 144 In the Lemon Court's opinion, subsidy of
sectarian educational budgets had crossed that line.
Of course, through history, Supreme Court justices have never
unanimously agreed where the constitutional line should be drawn.
Moreover, opinions of the justices appear to be based more on politics
than the Constitution. 145 For example, of the Supreme Court Justices de-
ciding the most recent cases, four have advocated an interpretation of the
Establishment Clause that relies on the principle of neutrality or non-
preferentialism, while four others have urged a more separationist inter-
pretation. 146 Hanging in the balance until her recent retirement has been
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, whose Establishment Clause opinions
have incorporated Chief Justice Berger's belief in the need for private
choice: Justice O'Connor has stressed that recipients of governmental aid
must be given genuine choices between secular and sectarian services for
programs to survive a First Amendment challenge.1 47 For this reason, in
2002, when the Court decided its most recent Establishment Clause case,
Justice O'Connor signed onto the five-to-four opinion, which relied
heavily on the protection of individual private choice. 148 While Lemon
focused its concentration on the danger of excessive entanglement, 49 the
Zelman opinion turned on the necessity of a non-coercive effect. 5 ' To-
gether with Lemon, this Zelman test, discussed in the following section,
will govern the next Establishment Clause controversy.
D. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Requirement of Non-Coercive Effect
Like many of the landmark Supreme Court Establishment Clause
decisions, the Zelman lawsuit concerned governmental aid to parochial
schools. 5 ' Here, a group of Ohio taxpayers sued to enjoin a state schol-
arship program that provided financial assistance to families in any de-
monstrably "failing" school district who chose to remove their children
to other area schools. 52 Under the program, parents were free to choose
any private or public school that was located within the geographic
boundaries of the covered district and that met statewide educational
144. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
145. See generally Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 92, at 281.
146. The four justices in the latter group are Souter, Stephens, Ginsberg, and Breyer. Cain,
supra note 97, at 1006 n.243 (citing Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793).
147. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
149. See supra Part IV.C.
150. See infra Part IV.D.
151. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 92, at 287.
152. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645.
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standards. 153 Parents who chose to send their children to private schools
received a tuition check that they endorsed over to their chosen school
for payment. 54 In practice, ninety-six percent of the 3700 students who
participated in the program enrolled in religiously affiliated schools.
55
In a five to four opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified two
primary areas of inquiry: (1) the purpose of the legislation, and (2) its
effect. 56 The Establishment Clause, he explained, prohibited states from
enacting laws for the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion; like-
wise, laws that had the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion were
impermissible.1
57
The Court dismissed the first issue, stating that it was beyond dis-
pute that the challenged program was enacted for the valid secular pur-
pose of providing education to poor children in a failing public school
system.158 Therefore, the sole issue that the Court identified was whether
the scholarship program had the forbidden effect of advancing or inhibit-
ing religion. 59 In dictum, Chief Justice Rehnquist did enumerate four
aspects of the Ohio program that ensured its neutral purpose: (1) the pro-
gram provided educational opportunity; (2) the recipients of the program
represented a broad class of individuals; (3) the program permitted the
participation of all schools, irrespective of religious or non-religious
character; and (4) the program allocated funding neutrally.' 60 The first
two aspects align with the Lemon "stated legislative intent" inquiry; and
the third and fourth, together, comprise the "neutrality" factor.
On the primary issue of religious impact the Court concluded that,
despite the high incidence of parochial school participation in Ohio's
program, since there was no evidence that the State deliberately skewed
incentives toward religious schools, the program entailed sufficient pri-
vate choice to withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.' 6' Chief Justice
Rehnquist framed the question in terms of government coercion, which
he answered by evaluating all options that the state provided to the pro-
gram participants. 62 Since only one option entailed obtaining a scholar-
ship and choosing a religious school, the Court concluded the voucher
program was not coercive in its impact. 161
153. Id.
154. Id. at 646.
155. Id. at 647.
156. Id. at 648-49 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 649.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 649-53.
161. Id. at 650.
162. Id. at 656.
163. Id.
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Since the Ohio program satisfied both the prongs of the test, the
Court reinstated the enjoined program, holding:
Where a government program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn,
direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their
own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause. A pro-
gram that shares these features permits government aid to reach re-
ligious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numer-
ous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the gov-
ernment, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. 164
The Zelman opinion thus distinguishes between government pro-
grams that aid religions directly and those that aid such groups indirectly
through recipient choice; the latter, "incidental" advancement comports
with the First Amendment requirement that the government refrain from
establishing religion. 165
Together, Lemon and Zelman provide the modem framework for
analyzing government funding programs that interface with religious
organizations. To fulfill the constitutional mandate that they not establish
religion, government funding programs must (1) have a purpose that nei-
ther advances nor inhibits religion, 66 which the Court interprets by ana-
lyzing the government's stated purpose167 and the neutrality of the fund-
ing program based on the third and fourth Zelman factors requiring that
(i) religious and non-religious recipients be treated alike, and that (ii)
funding is allocated neutrally; 168 (2) have an effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion,' 69 which the Court construes as protecting private
choice and freedom from coercion; 170 and (3) have freedom from exces-
sive entanglement between government and religious organizations,
which the Court interprets by analyzing the character and purpose of the
recipients, the nature of aid provided, and the resulting relationship be-
tween church and State.1 71 The following discussion applies the Lemon
and Zelman test to the Bush Administration's Faith-Based Initiative
164. Id. at 652.
165. Id. at 649.
166. Id. at 648-49.
167. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
168. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
169. Id. at 648-49.
170. Id. at 650, 656.
171. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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funding program, and argues that the Initiatives should fail to satisfy any
of the three elements.
V. PUTTING FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES TO THE TEST
A. The Initiatives Would Likely Fail the Secular Purpose Test
One of the Bush Administration's two stated purposes is a valid
secular goal. According to the executive order establishing the program,
the Initiatives are designed to meet the social and health needs of the
poor, thus "curbing crime, conquering addiction, strengthening families
and neighborhoods, and overcoming poverty. 172 Unlike the facts in
Lemon and Zelman, however, which did not provide the Court with any
reason to question the purported secular, educational goal of either pro-
gram, the words of President Bush and the totality of the factual circum-
stances surrounding the Initiatives undermine these stated secular inten-
tions. Lack of program oversight and measurement of program achieve-
ment solely in terms of year-over-year increase in grant dollars awarded
to religious groups rather than statistical reduction in crime, addiction,
and poverty indicate that these stated goals are not the real focus of the
Bush Administration.
President Bush's second purpose of ending federal funding dis-
crimination against faith-based organizations could also be a valid public
goal, since the United States Constitution prohibits discrimination based
on exercise of religion. 7 3 However, available facts, discussed below,
indicate that religious service providers have not been discriminated
against historically because there has always been governmental funding
of religious organizations in America.
In the following sub-sections, this comment applies the Lemon and
Zelman factors of (1) stated legislative purpose, (2) like treatment of reli-
gious and non-religious providers, and (3) neutral allocation of funding.
The Court should not accept as valid the Administration's official inten-
tions, since the evidence contradicts what President Bush and the Office
of Faith-Based Initiatives have represented to the American public.
Moreover, the religious nature and mission of sectarian organizations
have rightfully prevented them from entering into certain social service
contracts with the government. The Bush plan to allow religious groups
to run federally funded anti-poverty programs while maintaining their
religious character amounts to an accommodation of religion that results
172. Exec. Order No.13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
1011
Seattle University Law Review
in proselytization instead of a "level playing field" for faith-based or-
ganizations as President Bush has asserted.
1. The Goals of the Initiative Program are
Facially Valid, Secular Purposes
On their face, the executive orders establishing the Initiatives ap-
pear to have been enacted to achieve a "valid secular purpose." There-
fore, the Initiatives would satisfy both the Lemon "stated legislative in-
tent" inquiry and the Zelman requirement that the program be intended to
provide valid public services to a broad class of individuals. Just as in
Zelman, where Ohio intended its school voucher program to provide
educational opportunity to Cleveland students, the Initiatives' mission is
to improve communities by meeting social and healthcare needs of the
rural poor and underserved communities. 174 Deciding Zelman, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist also noted with approval that the Ohio program neutrally
distributed vouchers to a broad class of individuals identified as those in
any demonstrably failing school district.175 Here, the Initiative grants are
targeted to assist low-income, needy populations such as those in Frank-
lin County, Washington. 76 Socioeconomic status should satisfy the re-
quirement of a "broad" spectrum of groups not defined by its religious
affiliation.
In both earlier Supreme Court decisions, the justices raised and
dismissed the issue that the stated government purpose might be a proxy
for an impermissible purpose. In Lemon, Chief Justice Berger declined to
second-guess the states' legislative intent because he found no contradic-
tory facts. 17 Likewise, in Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist declined to
consider whether education was a proxy for a sectarian purpose of
Catholic indoctrination. 178 Unlike in Lemon and Zelman, the facts in the
present case tend to contradict the neutral purpose espoused in the Presi-
dential Orders that instituted the Faith-Based Initiatives.
2. The Structure and Implementation of the Initiatives
Strongly Suggest that Eradicating Poverty-Related Problems
is Not the Administration's Primary Purpose
I hope that Congress does not get caught up in stale, old, process ar-
gument of the legalisms involved with encouraging organizations of
174. See supra Part III.A.
175. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
176. See supra, Section iILA.
177. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
178. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
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faith to help people in need ... The[ir] argument is, let us focus on
the process. We're saying, let us focus on the results.1 79
The President's eschewing "process" in favor of "results" creates a
false dichotomy. His devaluation of process interests translates into in-
adequate infrastructure, which translates, in kind, into an inability to
quantify program results. Merriam-Webster defines faith as a firm belief
in something for which there is no proof; complete trust. 8 ° When it
comes to President Bush's Faith-Based Initiatives the title is eerily ap-
propriate since the lack of transparency in the granting process and lack
of administrative oversight on religious organization expenditures and
practices leave Americans with nothing to do but trust that the govern-
ment is abiding by the Constitution with this program. At the time of this
writing the Initiative program is alarmingly fragmented, de-centralized,
and too poorly monitored to produce tangible and meaningful perform-
ance data.' 8
Transparency is hindered by the fact that the states, not the federal
government, allocate most of the money awarded to these groups. 182 The
structure of American federalism gives state and local government flexi-
bility to disburse federal funds they receive through formula and block
grants. 183 But few state agencies keep record of which contractors are
sectarian versus secular in nature. 84 In practice, at least one state has
conceded that the faith-friendly environment at the federal level and
tightening state budgets have allowed state officials not to be vigilant in
monitoring religious service providers under contract.' 85
The Initiatives also lack centralized documentation about direct
contract recipients. Although the government maintains lists of awardees,
it does not keep accurate records of which groups are faith-based as op-
posed to secular. 86 In fact, when the President asked the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to conduct an internal audit, the de-
179. Remarks by President George W. Bush to the National Leadership of the Hispanic Faith-
Based Organizations, (May 22, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
05/20010523-1 .html.
180. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/faith.
181. LISA M. MONTIEL, THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR THE DELIVERY OF FAITH-BASED
SERVICES: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE FOCUSING ON THE PUBLIC FUNDING OF
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DELIVERY OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THE ROUNDTABLE ON
RELIGION AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 25 (2003).
182. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2.
183. MONTIEL, supra note 181, at 1.
184. Farris et al., supra note 4, at 4.
185. MONTIEL, supra note 181, at 22.
186. Id. at 25.
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partment reported having no faith-based liaisons because they mistakenly
categorized Habitat for Humanity as a non-religious service provider.
18 7
Data collection is also hampered by the structure of religious
groups, which may operate more informally than secular service provid-
ers. 188 These groups may not be organized optimally to produce budget
reports. 189
These issues have concerned Congress greatly. At the request of
Congress, in 2002 the Government Accounting Office (GAO) produced a
report documenting accountability problems with Federal faith-based
contracts.1 90 The GAO conducted research across five states and learned
that state and local officials varied significantly in their understanding of
safeguards such as the prohibition on the use of federal funds for reli-
gious worship or instruction.191 Despite this alarming inconsistency of
state implementation, neither the Administration nor the state agencies
had kept record of any incidents of safeguard violations.' 92 Based on its
findings, the GAO has issued a formal recommendation that one Federal
agency issue guidance to state and local governments to clarify for them
what activities religious groups are legally prohibited from supporting
with federal funds.193 At that time, the agency agreed to begin developing
such a program, but at the time of this writing, none has been pub-
lished. 194
Because of the transparency problems discussed above, it is diffi-
cult to conclude with certainty that the Initiatives satisfy the third or
fourth neutrality prongs of Zelman: participation of all service providers,
irrespective of religious or non-religious character; and neutral allocation
of government funding.1 95
Addressing the participation issue in Zelman, Chief Justice
Rehnquist reviewed the list of Cleveland schools eligible to receive
vouchers and deemed the Ohio program to be neutral because it permit-
ted the participation of all schools, irrespective of religious or non-
religious character. 196 Similarly, President Bush has stated that he intends
187. Farris et al., supra note 4, at 7.
188. MONTIEL, supra note 181, at 1.
189. Id.; see also discussion infra Part V.A.4.
190. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON STATUTORY PROVISIONS COULD IMPROVE CONSISTENCY OF
IMPLEMENTATION (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id.
195. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651 (2002).
196. Id. at 654.
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the Initiatives to level the playing field for faith-based, grass-roots, and
small community groups. 1
97
Despite the President's neutral terminology, however, it is not clear
what selection criteria the Administration uses for making award offers.
The White House has announced several criteria for evaluating grant
proposals, including need for the program and quality of the proposal. 98
However, the only indicator of relative participation is the White House
data sheet, which states simply that federal dollars directed to religious
grant recipients increased by forty-three percent from 2002 to 2004.'99
Religious groups' proportion of total available funding has also increased
dramatically during this time.2 °°
Indeed, one enduring theme in White House oversight has been the
measurement of the Initiatives' success solely in terms of year-over-year
increases in absolute dollars granted to religious groups. 20 1 A policy that
equates growth with progress deemphasizes serving recipients in favor of
the interests of the intermediary organizations. Describing himself as a"results-oriented" person responsible for Initiative accountability, Presi-
dent Bush has declared that he has overseen substantial progress toward
his goal of "a hopeful America for every person. 20 2 His progress report,
however, only addresses achievement of the goal "to make sure people
feel comfortable accessing the grant-making process, and/or that the bu-
reaucracy itself is fair in enabling faith-based organizations to apply...
we have to make sure that faith-based bidders are not being unfairly shut
out of the competition for federal money. 20 3 The President appears to
have eclipsed the goal of improving lives of the poor through enhanced
delivery of social and health services with fulfilling the hope of religious
organizations that wish to receive federal grant money. Whatever the
reason for the discrepancy, his statement suggests a disturbingly non-
neutral purpose of advancing religious organizations at the expense of
secular non-profit caregivers.
197. See generally, Press Release, The White House, Unlevel Playing Field: Barriers to Par-
ticipation by Faith-Based and Community Organizations in Federal Social Service Programs (Aug.
2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200l/08/unlevelfield.html.
198. DAVID J. DOWNEY, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY
INITIATIVES, DEVELOPING QUALITY GRANT PROPOSALS, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
govemmentfbci/qualityjproposal.pdf (last visited on Mar. 22, 2005).
199. SELECT GRANTS FY05, supra note 2.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see also supra Part IV.B.
202. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Highlights Faith-




Seattle University Law Review
Addressing the fourth prong of the neutrality test developed in Zel-
man, Chief Justice Rehnquist validated the purpose of the Ohio voucher
program because there were no financial incentives to skew the program
toward religious organizations; therefore, he concluded that the program
allocated financial incentives evenly.2 °4 In contrast, the Bush Administra-
tion openly has pursued a policy to incentivize administrative agencies to
fund religious groups and to empower such groups to compete for money
successfully. 20 5 In practice the President has dedicated significant re-
sources to garnering more religiously affiliated partners; his affirmative
actions seem to target them, in particular. The Administration's heavy
investment in directing its promotion activity selectively toward religious
groups indicates that the grants may have been skewed to favor sectarian
contractors.20 6
Another modern Supreme Court decision, Agostini v. Feldman,
20 7
in which the Court focused directly on the purpose of challenged gov-
ernment programs, adds a helpful evidentiary example to the neutral pur-
pose analysis discussed only briefly in Zelman.20 8 In Agostini v.
Feldman, the Court upheld a statute against an Establishment Clause
challenge that permitted the New York City Board of Education to send
public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial educa-
tion to disadvantaged children. 20 9 Central to the Court's ruling was its
observation that the program was carefully "constrained" by a detailed
set of written and oral instructions emphasizing the secular purpose of
Title I and setting out the rules to be followed to ensure that this purpose
was not compromised.2 10 The Faith-Based Initiative program is antitheti-
cal to the New York statute in this respect. As the foregoing discussion
makes clear, the Initiatives not only lack detailed instruction to religious
service providers, they appear to lack "constraint" of any meaningfulkind. 211
The Administration's failure to make clear rules for the Initiative
programs has one significant exception: its rule that allows religious or-
ganizations to hire based on religious affiliation. Excepting religious
grant recipients from federally mandated employment practices amounts
to religious accommodation. Although such accommodation can be per-
missible under specific situations, the Bush Administration's decision to
204. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651 (2002).
205. See supra Part III.A.
206. See id.
207. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
208. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655 56.
209. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35.
210. Id.
211. See infra Part V.B.
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allow employment discrimination for only its sectarian social service
contractors appears more like favoritism than neutrality, and further un-
dermines the stated purpose of the programs.
3. President Bush's Intent to End Discrimination
Belies Our Rich History of Church-State Partnership
The days of discrimination against religious groups just because
they are religious is coming to an end ... Welfare policy will not
solve the deepest problems of the spirit ... No government policy
can put hope in people's hearts or a sense of purpose in people's
lives.21 2
This presumption that federal law has oppressed religious groups
permeates the President's language in support of the Initiatives; but a
brief review of the history of American religious institutions paints a dif-
ferent picture. In fact, significant government financial support for reli-
gious public service providers dates back to colonial times.21 3 Large reli-
gious institutions, most notably the Catholic Church, enjoy a very lucra-
tive government partnership today.214 Promoting his Initiative program,
President Bush has greatly under-represented this long-standing relation-
ship.
As the Administration rightly has observed, government financial
support for religious organizations performing public services is not
new.215 Early in American history, colonial governments subsidized indi-
viduals to provide care to others in the community. 216 This partnership
expanded by the nineteenth century to include federal funding of private,
religiously affiliated orphanages and hospitals.217 Funding for large
evangelical and Christian organizations like the Salvation Army, Good
Will Industries, and Habitat for Humanity increased during the twentieth
century along with increased hospital expenditures legislated by Con-
gress.2 18
212. George W. Bush, December, 2002 Speech to Philadelphia Religious Leaders (quoted in
Farris et al., supra note 4, at 5).
213. Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny Dome with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Charitable Choice, 5
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 149, 170 (2000).
214. See, e.g., Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe is not Enough: When
Religion Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725 (2004).
215. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Dokupil, supra note 213, at 169-70.
216. Dokupil, supra note 213, at 170.
217. Id.
218. Id.; LoIs UTTLEY & RONNIE PAWELKO, PUBLIC FUNDING OFRELIGIOUS HOSPITALS IN THE
UNITED STATES, A PUBLICATION OF THE EDUCATION FUND OF FAMILY PLANNING ADVOCATES OF
NEW YORK STATE 4-5 (2002).
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In 1996, drafters of welfare reform legislation leaned heavily on
this tradition.2 19 Congress was desperate to cut dollars from anti-poverty
programs and the public, cynical about apparent hand-outs for the unem-
ployed, was pushing for change.220 Again, private contractors were the
attractive solution. Under the aegis of then Senator John Ashcroft, Chari-
table Choice provisions of the new welfare policy encouraged states to
contract with religious organizations to fill the gap created by the demise
of welfare cash entitlements. 1
Through Charitable Choice, a product of the efforts of the Christian
Right, welfare dollars poured into the budgets of religious social and
health service providers.222 By 1998, the federal government was provid-
ing forty-eight million dollars to religiously affiliated hospitals through
programs such as Medicaid each year.223 In Washington State, twenty-
three percent of over thirty-three million TANF ("Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families", the program that replaced welfare) dollars were
spent on religious organizations in 2001.224
In the past several years, as state fiscal crises mount, legislators
such as those in Washington State are increasingly anxious to privatize
social and health service delivery systems to cut expenses further.22 5 For
example, Washington legislators proposed House Bill 1464 in 2003,
which mandated appointment of administrators in the Department of So-
cial and Health Services (DSHS) to serve as faith-based liaisons.226 The
hope was to be ready to compete successfully for Initiative dollars if the
Administration later set more money aside for state use. 2 27
In 2004, The White House did direct Initiative dollars to a Wash-
ington facility. The Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
awarded Lourdes Healthcare a grant from its Compassion Capital Fund
(CCF.)228 The CCF is a four year old Health Department fund that allo-
219. Dokupil, supra note 214, at 155.
220. See, e.g., David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REv 633
(2004).
221. See Wendy Pollack, National Center on Poverty Law, An Introduction for The Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families Program, Poverty Law Manual for the New Lawyer 26-41 (2002) (on
file with author); Farris et al., supra note 4, at 4.
222. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 215, at 729.
223. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2.
224. Id. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, one type of social assistance available to
states through Charitable Choice.
225. Don Jenkins, Backers Praise Washington State Bill to Promote Faith-Based Aid, THE
COLUMBIAN, Feb. 6, 2003, at cl.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Press Release, The United States Department of Health and Human Services, President
Announces 43 Million in Grants from Compassion Capital Fund (Aug. 3, 2004) [hereinafter CCF
Grants] (on file with author).
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cates money to intermediary organizations that provide training, techni-
cal assistance and sub-awards to religious service providers. 229 Since the
program's inception, nearly one hundred million dollars has been
awarded to 1906 organizations. 230 One subset of CCF grants totals $4.9
million under the CCF Targeted Capacity Building Program. Through
this program the government has awarded grants to one hundred organi-
zations that work on issues such as at-risk youth, homelessness, healthy
marriages and rural community assistance. 231 Lourdes got one of these
grants in August 2004, for $50,000.232
Through thousands of grants such as these, President Bush has pur-
ported to "level the playing field" for religious organizations to compete
with secular providers for federal funding. However, history shows that
religious groups have not been discriminated against by the federal gov-
ernment. In fact, sectarian organizations like Lourdes have long received
substantial government assistance. However, the Administration has im-
plemented this policy of "formal neutrality" at the same time that it has
exempted religious groups from hiring discrimination and separation of
religious character from government funded social and health programs.
The religious nature of faith-based organizations is best understood as a
factor that inhibits such groups' ability to deliver the quality of human
services that the Federal government requires.
4. Religious Character Hampers Sectarian Providers'
Ability to Fulfill Government Contracts
What faith-based programs say, time after time, is that miracles are
possible. When somebody puts their arm around a neighbor and
says, God loves you, I love you, and you can count on us both.
Faith-based programs work. They are able to address the deepest
needs of our heart.233
Another major premise upon which President Bush has justified the
Faith-Based Initiatives is the presupposed superlative performance of
religious groups providing charitable care. His belief that religious or-
ganizations are optimal social and health service providers is appealing,
229. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Serv., Administration for Children & Families, About the
Compassion Capital Fund (CCF), http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ccf/about-ccf/index.html (last
visited Mar. 26, 2006).
230. CCF Grants, supra note 229.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Dedication to the Oak Cliff Bible Fellowship
Youth Education Center (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/10/20031029-10.html.
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and his claim tracks with the mission statements of many religious
234groups. However, available evidence does not support the contention
that religious groups are in fact the backbone of charity care.235
Factors unique to religious organizations may inhibit their ability to
deliver public social service programs optimally. Compared to their secu-
lar counterparts, sectarian institutions (1) lack the staff qualified to pro-
vide specialized services, 236 (2) lack the organizational infrastructure
suited for government contracts,23 and (3) lack a core mission consistent
with government goals.238
Religious groups may experience difficulty meeting the regulatory
requirement of staff with specialized training for some types of social
services. 239 Religious groups tend to hire more lay volunteers and staff
with degrees from divinity schools. 240 They are less likely to employ li-
censed social workers, drug treatment counselors, or psychologists than
secular agencies. 241 Therefore, they may be less qualified than secular
agencies to respond to the needs of the underserved. This distribution of
resources appears to place religiously affiliated organizations at a com-
petitive disadvantage than the more streamlined and specialized non-
profit service providers. In contrast to public and private non-profits,
President Bush's Armies of Compassion, unfortunately, are likely not
armed with necessary credentials to meet modern governmental compli-
ance standards.
Additionally, religious organizations are guided by principles that
may conflict with government goals. While the government mission fo-
cuses on delivery of services, faith-based programs focus more on trans-
formation of the spirit and the values of recipients.242 Recognizing this
potential conflict, some religious group leaders fear that by engaging in
234. See, e.g., LOURDES HEALTH NETWORK, ABOUT US: OUR HISTORY (2006), available at
http://www.lourdeshealth.net/about/history.htm [hereinafter LOURDES 2006]; LEWIS D. SOLOMON &
MATTHEW J. VLISSIDES, JR., IN GOD WE TRUST? ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OF FAITH-BASED
SOCIAL SERVICES, 2001 PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE 3, available at http://www.ppionline.org/
documents/FBOs v2.pdf. The President is not alone in this belief; a 1990 New York Times poll
found that sixty-eight percent of Americans believe that churches are better able to fight poverty
than government. Id.
235. UTTLEY & PAWELKO, supra note 219, at 5; SOLOMON & VLISSIDES, supra note 234, at 4-
6.
236. MONTIEL, supra note 181, at 22.
237. Id. at 24.
238. Id.; SOLOMON & VLISSIDES, JR., supra note 235 at 10 11.
239. SOLOMON & VLISSIDES, JR., supra note 235, at 13.
240. See id, see also UTTLEY & PAWELKO, supra note 219, at 21.
241. SOLOMON & VLISSIDES, JR., supra note 235, at 13.
242. MONTIEL, supra note 181, at 24.
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government contracts they will be "captured by the appropriations proc-
ess" and will lose their sectarian identity.2
43
These factors may make religious organizations either unwilling or
unable to match the performance of their secular non-profit counterparts,
and may account for the fact that religious organizations report less char-
ity care than non-sectarian service providers.2 44 A recent comparison has
demonstrated that religiously affiliated hospitals treat half as many poor
patients as do public hospitals in the same states, based on percentage of
revenue from Medicaid reimbursement.245 A parallel study reviewing
reports of non-reimbursed charity care recently has uncovered the same
discrepancy: religious hospitals provide significantly less charity care
than all other hospitals with the exception of private, for-profit entities.2 46
This phenomenon pertains to Franklin County, Washington, where
secular La Clinica outperforms Catholic Lourdes Medical Center.
Lourdes is currently licensed for 132 beds, of which it uses only twenty-
three on an average day.247 Of Acension Healthcare's $6.9 billion operat-
ing budget, less than $4.5 million was spent on charity care compared to
$5 million out of $20 million at La Clinica. In a recent year, outpatient
visits at Lourdes dropped by several thousand. 24 8 La Clinica, in contrast,
experienced a large increase in outpatients during the same period.2 49
These trends indicate that, despite heavy federal government sub-
sidy, sectarian facilities like Lourdes are not the best positioned to pro-
vide public charity care. The observation that the sectarian character of
religious organizations is central to their mission to heal the sick and
needy through personal transformation 21 is of critical concern to the
constitutionality of the Initiative programs. The following section ex-
pands on this issue in the context of Catholic hospitals such as Lourdes.
5. Religious Character is Inseparable from Catholic Healthcare Policy
and Should Disqualify Catholic Hospitals from Federal Grants
The most impressive example of a publicly funded sectarian enter-
prise is the Catholic Church. In particular, Catholic Church owned and
243. SOLOMON & VLISSIDES, supra note 235, at 13.
244. UTrLEY & PAWELKO, supra note 219, at 16-20.
245. Id. at 17.
246. Id. at 19.
247. See Trumbo II, supra note 37.
248. LOURDES HEALTH NETWORK, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2003) (on file with the author) [herein-
after LOURDES 2003].
249. Trumbo I, supra note 31.
250. MONTIEL, supra note 181, at 24.
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operated hospital facilities have benefited from government contracts.251
Today, of the nearly one-fifth of all hospital beds owned by religiously
affiliated hospitals in America, seventy percent are Catholic.252 While
religious in name and official sponsorship, nearly all of these hospitals'
253operating budgets are funded with government money.
Lourdes Medical Center, the sole hospital provider in Franklin
County, Washington, is illustrative of large-scale Catholic health con-
glomerates.254 Founded nearly one hundred years ago by the Sisters of St.
Joseph, the Lourdes mission is "a commitment to excellence, serving all
persons in a Christian spirit ... offered by professionals who are com-
mitted to the delivery of holistic healthcare as an extension of the healing
ministry of Jesus., 255 In 2002, Lourdes was purchased by Ascension
256Healthcare, the largest healthcare network in the country. The merger
brought the total number of Ascension hospitals to eighty.25 Boasting
80,000 employees, Ascension reportedly owned $8.9 billion in assets at
the time of the Lourdes acquisition.258
Like all healthcare institutions affiliated with the Roman Catholic
Church, Ascension (and Lourdes) policy is governed by the Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Healthcare Services promulgated by
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.259 All Catholic health-
care institutions, their employees, contractors, and those granted medical
privilege to practice in them, are required to adhere to the Directives.260
The Directives comprise rules that the Church leadership has issued
to resolve conflicts between Catholic doctrine and medical science, and,
together the Directives form a dynamic, evolving statement of ethical
principles updated continually by the Conference. A panel of Bishops
regularly reviews technological developments in medical treatment and,
in consultation with medical professionals, judge innovative techniques"according to the principles of right reason and the ultimate standard of
revealed truth, and offer[s] authoritative teaching and guidance about the
251. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 215, at 742-43; Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1091; GUIDANCE,
supra note 7, at 2.
252. LOiS UTTLEY & RONNIE PAWELKO, No STRINGS ATTACHED: PUBLIC FUNDING OF
RELIGIOUSLY SPONSORED HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES, MERGERWATCH, A PUBLICATION OF
THE EDUCATION FUND OF FAMILY PLANNING ADVOCATES OF N.Y. STATE 4 (2002).
253. Id. at 15.
254. See Trumbo I, supra note 31.
255. LOURDES 2006, supra note 235.
256. LOURDES 2003, supra note 249.
257. Id.
258. Annette Cary, Lourdes to Join Health Network, TRI-CITY HERALD, June 20, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.tri-eityherald.com/news/2002/0620/story2.html.
259. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS
DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE SERVICES, (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter DIRECTIVES].
260. Id. at 7.
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moral and pastoral responsibilities entailed by the Christian faith. '' 261 In
practice, the Church puts each new medical procedure through a moral
litmus test: those that fail to support the Catholic belief in sanctity of
human life are deemed unethical and may not be practiced in a Catholic
facility. According to the Bishops, the Directives assure the result that"each person must form a correct conscience based on the moral norms
for proper health care. 262
Not surprisingly, many of the Directives expressly forbid gyneco-
logical procedures designed to prevent, terminate, or induce preg-
nancy. 263 For example, most infertility treatments, sterilization, and abor-
tion are banned.264 Contraception other than "natural family planning" is
also prohibited.265 The Directives do not provide exceptions for rape,
incest, or to protect the life or health of the woman, so the use of aborti-
facients is prohibited to treat ectopic pregnancy, which almost always
endangers the health or life of the woman.2
6 6
The Catholic notion of "correct conscience," through which the
Church judges the efficacy of such gynecological procedures, can and
does conflict with standards of care established by the American Medical
Association (AMA). For example, the AMA states: "Physicians are obli-
gated to ensure that sexual assault patients are properly informed of all
risks and interventions to prevent conception as a result of sexual as-
sault., 267 In direct conflict, Ethical Directive Number 45 provides that
"Catholic health care institutions are not to provide abortion services,
even based upon the principle of material cooperation. In this context,
Catholic healthcare institutions need to be concerned about the danger of
scandal in any association with abortion services. 268 Catholic hospital
doctors thus avoid the "scandal" of violating Catholic doctrine by declin-
ing to advise their female patients about abortion or emergency contra-
ception. However, they do so in violation of their ethical promises to be
honest and to make patient care their paramount concern. 269
261. Id. at 5.
262. Id. (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 13-16.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 16.
266. Id. at 15.
267. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, STRATEGIES FOR THE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT (1995).
268. DIRECTIVES, supra note 260, at 15.
269. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2001), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html. "
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The Directives also violate Washington State Law.27 ° In Washing-
ton, every hospital that provides care for survivors of sexual assault is
required to provide patients with accurate information about emergency
contraception, and to prescribe such medication immediately upon re-
quest.2 71 Nevertheless, out of eighteen Catholic hospital emergency
rooms surveyed recently in Washington, only two reported providing
emergency contraception upon the patient's request. 272 Only four would
refer patients to other providers willing to dispense emergency contra-
273ception. Of those, three referrals resulted in dead ends; only one re-
ferred patient eventually received the prescription she sought.27 4
Under this scenario, Catholic hospital doctors follow the directives
at the expense of the wellbeing of their female patients. Women or girls
who have been raped or whose embryos have implanted dangerously in
their fallopian tubes and who seek treatment in a Catholic hospital emer-
gency room will receive substandard care compared to what the medical
community identifies as the best demonstrated practice. As a result, some
of these women and girls may give birth unwillingly to children borne of
rape; and worse, some of these women and girls may die.
Contrary to the President's representations, the federal funding
market historically is rich with examples of large, well-financed religious
health conglomerates exemplified by networks like Ascension Health.275
Despite President Bush's apologetic verbiage to faith-based groups, we
should query whether patients such as female rape survivors are the true
victims of discrimination. The Initiatives have earmarked federal grants
for hospitals that opt out of legally mandated, medically indicated treat-
ments. Instead of "leveling the playing field" for religious groups, Presi-
dent Bush appears to be pushing a mountain of dollars their way while
leaving patient's rights, as well as those facilities respecting patients'
rights, in the ditch.
In promoting his agenda, President Bush has taken the results of re-
ligiously run government social and health service providers for granted.
This assumption is not proven and available studies suggest that it is
false.2 76 The Initiatives have provided what some policy analysts con-
270. See CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, SECOND CHANCE DENIED: EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION IN CATHOLIC HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOMS 12 (2002) [hereinafter SECOND
CHANCE DENIED], available at http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/healthcare/documents/
2002secondehancedenied 001 .pdf.
271. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.41.350.
272. SECOND CHANCE DENIED, supra note 271, at 18.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See supra Part V.B.1.
276. See, e.g., UTTLEY & PAWELKO, supra note 219, at 5; SOLOMAN & VLISSIDES, supra note
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sider to be a valuable opportunity to test the presumption President Bush
has advanced.27 7 This opportunity may be squandered without the desire
and means to monitor these groups' success. 278 The Bush Administration
has thus far failed to track performance for faith-based and community
organizations. 279 This failure prevents us from knowing with certainty
how effectively faith-based groups are in meeting the social and health
service needs of the poor and underserved. More importantly to this
comment, the Administration's failure to measure its success in reducing
poverty-related social and health problems is powerful evidence that
these are not the Administration's primary objectives.
I recognize that government can hand out money, but what it cannot
do is put hope in people's hearts or a sense of purpose in people's
lives. What I want to do is unleash the great compassion of Amer-
ica, by changing America one heart, one soul, one conscience at a
time.11°
Such language espousing the desire to impact the souls and con-
science of individual Americans is strongly suggestive of a sectarian
purpose. Although President Bush's executive orders creating the Initia-
tives purport to fulfill the valid public objective of providing social and
health services for the poor and needy, 28' his personal characterization of
the Initiatives creates the image of an evangelical mission. Analyzed us-
ing both the Lemon and Zelman neutral purpose tests2 82 the Faith-Based
Initiatives appear to serve a primarily religious purpose: to heal the souls
of America's desperately poor and needy with federal dollars.
B. The Initiatives Would Fail the Effects Test
Because They Deny Individual Private Choice
Supreme Court decisions have consistently distinguished between
government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools and
those that are based on "true private choice," defined as "genuine and
independent choices of private individuals. 28 3  The Zelman case ad-
dressed an Establishment Clause challenge in the context of "neutral
government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of indi-
viduals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of
277. David A. Sherwood, Testing Time for Christianity: Can we Turn Good Goals into Good
Practice?, SOCIAL WORK AND CHRISTIANITY 28:1, at 105 (2001).
278. Id.
279. See infra Part IV.C.
280. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2.
28 1. See ORDERS, supra note 1.
282. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649-53 (2002).
283. Id. at 649.
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their own choosing., 284 Focusing on the issue of coercion, the Zelman
court decided that question "must be answered by evaluating all options
Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a
program scholarship and then choose a religious school., 28
Unlike the Ohio voucher program, the federal government awards
Initiative grants directly to church-run hospitals through programs such
as CCF.286 (Block or formula grants go indirectly to church-run hospitals
via intermediary state governments and religious organizations, but the
recipients do not get direct aid under these programs).287 Under this
scheme, targeted groups in underserved and needy communities are not
assured the independent choice of healthcare providers.
The individual recipients have been denied private choice where, as
in the situation of the residents of Franklin County, Washington, Catholic
Church hospitals are their only option for services such as outpatient
emergent care and their medical services are truncated by religious re-
strictions like the Ethical Directives.2 88 Eighty-five percent of women
expect that they can get a full range of gynecological services at their
local hospital.289 However, patients are not given a true choice when,
even if they are able to travel to another facility that will provide the care
they seek, the Initiatives neither require the hospital to disclose its re-
strictions at the outset, nor to report its performance to the federal gov-
ernment agency. Lourdes Healthcare is, unfortunately, not an isolated
case: 48 of 585 Catholic hospitals in a recent study report that they are
the only provider in the area.290 Nationally, over one hundred counties
contain a single, Catholic affiliated hospital today.291
Under the Zelman test, rural Catholic hospitals are coercive if they
offer no alternatives to poor clients seeking gynecological service offer-
ings that fall below best demonstrated standards promulgated by the
American Medical Association. This concern is supported by evidence
that, the extent to which religious social service programs are successful
may be attributable to the transforming nature of the missionary ap-
proach. The testimony of two of Lourdes Counseling Center's former
patients tells this story:
When I was twenty years old my husband was killed in a car acci-
dent. Part of me wanted to die. I attempted suicide three times. I
284. Id.
285. Id. at 655-56.
286. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 4.
287. Id. at 3.
288. See supra Parts II, V.A.1.
289. SECOND CHANCE DENIED, supra note 271.
290. UTTLEY & PAWELKO, supra note 219, at 4.
291. SECOND CHANCE DENIED, supra note 271.
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was headed for my fourth when Lourdes Counseling Center found
me. I met angels that night . . . gentile, honest, kind people from
Lourdes. I must have had a spiritual experience at Lourdes because
it changed everything.
292
Lourdes Counseling Center literally saved my life. Not only did
Lourdes teach me how to change my life for the better, but they
supported me while I transitioned to becoming part of their family. I
have a deep respect for the people who work here, and now that I
am no longer a client but an employee, I look forward to coming to
work each day.293
C. The Initiatives Excessively Entangle Government and Religion
The third prong of the Lemon test (not addressed directly in Zel-
man)294 is the requirement that government programs not excessively
entangle government with religion.295 To determine whether the Initia-
tives satisfy this test, this Comment will evaluate (1) the character and
purpose of the faith-based grant recipients, (2) the nature of the aid pro-
vided, and (3) the resulting relationship between government and
church.296 The Initiatives will fail each of these evaluations, because (1)
the Initiatives expressly provide that faith-based grant recipients can re-
tain their religious character, (2) the aid flows directly to the organiza-
tions, which are guided by the Catholic Directives, and (3) there is al-
ready an intertwined relationship between the government and the reli-
gious organizations. Moreover, to the extent that the White House could
improve its reporting and accountability over the Initiative programs,
existing entanglement would become increasingly excessive in the fu-
ture.
The Initiatives fail to satisfy the requirement that they fund activi-
ties that can be kept distinct from religious indoctrination. Like the paro-
chial school aid challenged in Lemon, the Initiative grants flow to or-
ganizations that are intrinsically religious entities. Lourdes Hospital, for
example, may retain its religious iconography,297 may hire employees
292. Personal testimonial from Trish Segerdel, Lourdes Health Fact Sheet at 13 (on file with
author).
293. Personal testimonial from John Smith, Lourdes Health Fact Sheet at I l(on file with au-
thor).
294. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
295. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-15 (1971).
296. Id. at 615.
297. Exec. Order No.13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002); Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 7, at 4.
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discriminatorily, 298 and is permitted to follow the Ethical Directives of
the Catholic Church. 99 As was the case in Lemon, Lourdes' healthcare
program cannot be meaningfully separated from its Catholic ideology.
Although Catholic hospitals provide a secular service-healthcare-it is
provided in the context and constraints of Catholic doctrine.
The Initiatives also fail to fulfill the second requirement that the na-
ture of aid provided avoid the risk of inserting religion into the social
service program. In Lemon, Chief Justice Berger distinguished funding
for textbooks, which he believed had little potential for prosetylization,
with funding for teacher compensation, which was highly problematic in
his opinion.300 Particularly worrisome to Chief Justice Berger was the
fact that parochial school teachers were bound by a Catholic handbook of
education policy.301 Similarly, Lourdes medical staff must follow the
Ethical Directives of the Catholic Church.302 As in Lemon, the nature of
the aid the Initiatives provide to Lourdes Healthcare creates strong poten-
tial for religious morality to intermingle with health services offered to
poor Franklin County residents seeking procedures at odds with the
Catholic faith. Therefore, the initiatives would fail the second part of the
entanglement test.
Today, the Initiatives excessively entangle the government with re-
ligion, and the relationship would only become more heavily intertwined
if the White House were to implement structural changes recommended
by the GAO and to improve its reporting system.30 3 As it stands today,
there is an unacceptably interwoven relationship between the government
and religious grant recipients. Religious grant applicants must submit
proposals to the White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives. The
White House provides agency resources to assist religious groups
through the grant-writing process. 30 4 To varying degrees, the granting
agencies require that faith-based groups follow federal guidelines for
spending caps, allowable expenses, and specific staffing mandates3 °5 The
Office of Faith-Based Initiatives assigns a federal employee to each grant
recipient as a consultant. 6 Grant recipients are also required to maintain
financial records and to conduct and report periodic self-audits. 307 In ad-
298. Exec. Order No.13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141-42 (Dec. 12, 2002); Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 7, at 4.
299. See supra Part V.A.5.
300.403 U.S. at 617-18.
301. Id. at 618.
302. See supra Part V.A.5.
303. As argued supra Part IV.A.2.
304. GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 4.
305. Id at 5.
306. Id. at 6.
307. Id. at 7.
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dition, recipients are required to provide the federal regulatory agency
with regular financial reports, which the government has committed to
scrutinize to determine whether the organization has complied with all of
the agency's rules.3 °8 All of these entanglements will increase the
church-state partnership as the Administration continuously increases the
amount of dollars earmarked for religious poverty programs.
VII. CONCLUSION
I believe in the power of faith in people's lives. Our government
should not fear programs that exist because a church or a synagogue
or a mosque has decided to start one. We should not discriminate
against programs based upon faith in America. We should enable
them to access federal money, because faith-based programs can
change people's lives, and America will be better off for it. 30 9
Whether America will be better off once the needy have been trans-
formed by faith is an open question. Nevertheless, the President has
acted methodically to reverse federal policy on this issue and to build a
new layer of federal bureaucracy dedicated to disseminating his personal
belief in transformational healing. 310 With individual religious identity
again at the forefront of American discourse, what does seem certain,
however, is that the timeless issue of the relationship between church and
state is as relevant and contentious today as it was in 1789. In recent his-
tory, governmental support of religion has gained momentum from the
Charitable Choice provisions of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.311 Presi-
dent Bush has capitalized on this trend, crossing the boundary of gov-
ernment sponsored religion by creating a huge, privately run and feder-
ally funded welfare system that places his vision of religion into the eve-
ryday lives of the American poor. The official language, focused on
equality and non-discrimination, seems neutral on the surface because it
commits to safeguard the religious nature of providers while protecting
the free choice of recipients. But the President's verbiage is simplistic,
vague, and, based on the totality of the surrounding circumstances, dis-
turbingly disingenuous.
President Bush's faith-based programs would fail a First Amend-
ment Establishment Clause challenge. The Initiatives would fail the
combined Lemon and Zelman test, which holds that sectarian programs
pass Constitutional muster only by demonstrating a neutral purpose, neu-
308. Id. at 6.
309. FUNDS,supra note 53, at 83.
310. Farris et al., supra note 4, at 4.
311. See GAO REPORT, supra note 190.
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tral impact, protection of true, private choice, and freedom from exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion.
Since neither the President nor his Administration has built over-
sight or transparency into the Faith-Based Initiatives, and since the
President's own words are at odds with the neutral language espoused in
the Executive Orders, the laudable goal of fighting poverty-related social
and health problems is suspect. The Administration's failure to manage
or publish the Initiatives' impact on welfare of the poor strongly suggests
that the American public should be suspicious about its stated goals.
Additionally, it is clear the Initiatives fail to safeguard individual
recipients against religious coercion. The Administration's funding of
religious service providers forces rural and poor healthcare recipients
like those in Franklin County, Washington, to rely on Catholic Hospitals
that follow the Ethical Directives of the Catholic Church, not the best
practices promulgated by the American Medical Association. American
taxpayers would have a cause of action against the Initiatives program
because the Initiatives, through federal tax dollars, fund programs such
as the Compassion Capital Fund, which sponsors social service programs
at Lourdes Healthcare, a Catholic facility that advances a religious
agenda and which coercively limits rural patient programs to those that
comport with the Catholic faith.
Third, the Administration's dual policies to treat religious social
service grant recipients the same as secular providers while allowing the
religious organizations to maintain their religious mission and nature
creates an obvious and ever-increasing entanglement problem. The Ini-
tiatives effectively force the federal government to supervise the admini-
stration of pervasively sectarian organizations. Moreover, this relation-
ship will only intensify as the Administration achieves its stated goal to
steadily increase the number of federal grant dollars awarded to sectarian
social service providers.
Unfortunately, the recent retirement of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and the arrival of Justice Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court
makes the outcome of such litigation less certain than it would have been
just one year ago. While Justice O'Connor persistently has voted to pro-
tect true private choice, it is not yet clear how Justice Alito would decide
this issue. Whatever the ultimate outcome in the Court, as stewards of the
Bill of Rights we must strive to halt the incremental erosion of freedom
from religious coercion exemplified by the President's Faith-Based Ini-
tiatives. Today we, as citizens of the United States have the opportunity,
and, under the United States Constitution we have the obligation.
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